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INTRODUCTION
In December 2002, South Koreans elected their fourth president since the 
country’s  transition to procedural democracy in 1987. The significance of 
these elections is that to all outside appearances, they demonstrate that South
Korea has made a successful transition to a fully democratic system of 
government. Today, unlike in the years immediately following the 1987
elections and even as recently as the 1997 Asian financial crisis, there is general
consensus that a return to the pre-1987 days of military involvement in the 
political process or usurpation of power by an incumbent president has 
become virtually impossible. The military has become sufficiently professional 
to dismiss any speculation about a possible military coup. The election process
appears to be firmly entrenched in South Korean society with a growing 
expectation that campaigns will be run fairly, or at least with increasingly less
visible corruption. Political parties, while still vulnerable to personality 
dominance and a lack of ideological distinction, are generally recognized as the 
legitimate means for articulating political demands within the society.
Even more to the point of a maturing democracy within South Korea,
there has been a growing demand by civic groups and individual citizens for 
fair and responsive leaders. Civic activism for identifying and isolating corrupt
and incompetent politicians within the system has grown over the years.
Recent presidents Kim Dae-jung and Kim Young-sam have seen their sons
prosecuted for political corruption. Prominent businessmen have been 
prosecuted for financial misconduct, several politicians have been removed 
from power for political corruption and the generals have been removed from
the political process. In the words of Adam Przeworski, South Korea is
approaching the minimum structural conditions for democratic consolidation
where democracy ‘becomes the only game in town…[and] all the losers want 
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to do is to try again within the same institutions under which they have just 
lost’.1
This apparent success in establishing democracy in a country without a 
democratic tradition, along with the juxtaposition of the last Stalinist holdout 
in North Korea, has made South Korea one of the more interesting cases of 
democratic transition among the countries that have undergone the transition 
to democracy as part of the third wave of global democratization.2  With June 
29, 1987(the date that Roh Tae-woo promised to institute direct presidential 
elections, among other initiatives) isolated as the defining moment in the 
transition, South Korean democratization has been the subject of investigation 
by a variety of scholars with a wide range of perspectives. Indeed, with its 
spectacular economic growth under the authoritarian regimes of Park Chung-
hee and Chun Doo-hwan in the 1970s and 1980s followed by the increase in 
civil protest supported by the new middle class, South Korea served as a 
textbook example of the economic preconditions theory of democratic 
transition. South Korea also represented a classic case for those interested in 
the cultural aspects of democratic transitions.3 Given the political intrigue 
associated with the presidential elections in 1987, some have also presented 
Korea as a classic case of elite contingency calculations driving the transition 
process.4 Regardless of the theoretical orientation of the analysis, the common 
conclusion is that by all accounts South Korea has made a successful transition 
to democracy. In fact, there is general consensus in the comparative politics 
literature that the transition to direct presidential elections with suffrage 
extended to a relatively high percentage of the adult population and a 
reasonable opportunity to vote for the opposition is firmly in place—the 
fundamental characteristics of the political order Dahl refers to as polyarchy.5
1 Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern 
Europe and Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p.26. 
2 For a discussion on the waves of democratic transition see Samuel Huntington, The Third 
Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 
1991).
3 See for example Geir Helgesen, Democracy and Authority in Korea: The Cultural Dimension in 
Korean Politics (Richmond: Curzon Press, 1998) and Daniel Bell et. al., Towards Illiberal Democracy 
in Pacific Asia (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1995). 
4 Manwoo Lee, The Odyssey of Korean Democracy (New York: Preager, 1990) and Hyug Baeg, ‘The 
Politics of Democratic Transition From Authoritarian Rule in South Korea’, Sang-Yong Choi, 
ed., Democracy in Korea: Its Ideals and Realities (Seoul: the Korean Political Science Association, 
1997), pp.71-92. 
5 Dahl specifically refers to polyarchy as being distinguished by two broad characteristics: 
Citizenship extended to a relatively high proportion of adults and the rights of citizenship 
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Beyond the transition itself, scholars have examined how South Korean 
political institutions and political values have been modified and adapted 
through the consolidation phase of the democratization process. Here we find 
much less optimism regarding the institutionalization of democracy in the 
country. Although again argued from various perspectives, there appears to be 
a general consensus among analysts that South Korea has yet to achieve a fully 
consolidated democracy however the analyst chooses to define the term. For 
example, Diamond and Kim introduce their edited volume analyzing the 
institutionalization of democracy in South Korea by stating that, ‘its political 
institutions remain shallow and immature, unable to structure meaningful 
policy courses and to provide the responsiveness, accountability, and 
transparency expected by the South Korean public’.6  Throughout the volume, 
individual contributors point consistently to a pattern of interplay between 
political institutions, political culture and political behavior that has 
contributed to the general ‘weakness’ of democracy in the country. Elsewhere, 
in a more structural analysis of the democratization process, Croissant argues 
that since the transition in 1987 the usurpation of power by the executive 
branch, the corresponding weakening of the legislative branch and the ongoing 
ineffectiveness of the judiciary have precluded democratic consolidation for 
now or in the near future.7  Others have attempted to show the general 
incompatibility between Korean civic or political culture and the democratic 
institutions established with the founding of the republic in 1948.8  The 
conclusion drawn is that the consolidation of democracy is fundamentally 
including the opportunity to oppose and vote out the highest officials of the government. 
More specifically, he specifies seven institutions that distinguish a polyarchy. They are: elected 
officials, free and fair elections, inclusive suffrage, right to run for office, freedom of 
expression, alternative information and associational autonomy. Robert A. Dahl, Democracy and 
its Critics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), pp.220-221. 
6 Larry Diamond and Byung-kook Kim, ‘Introduction: Consolidating Democracy in Korea,’ in 
Larry Diamond and Byung-kook Kim eds., Consolidating Democracy in Korea (Boulder: Lynne 
Reinner Publishers, 1991), p.2. 
7 Aurel Croissant, ‘Strong Presidents, Weak Democracy? Presidents, Parliaments and Political 
Parties in South Korea’, Korea Observer, Vol. 33, No. 1 (Spring 2002), pp.1-45. 
8 Sunhyuk Kim in ‘Civic Mobilization for Democratic Reform,’ in, Larry Diamond and Doh 
Chull Shin eds., Institutional Reform and Democratic Consolidation in Korea (Stanford: Hoover 
Institution Press, 1999), pp.279-303 argues that while citizen mobilization was instrumental in 
achieving the transition, the inability to channel their energies into political parties has been a 
detriment in the consolidation process. In a more expansive argument, Helgesen op. cit., argues 
that the general incompatibility of Korean culture with western democratic structures 
precludes full consolidation of liberal democracy in Korea. Also see Doh Chull Shin, Mass
Politics and Culture in Democratizing Korea (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
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different, and indeed more difficult, than the transition to democratic 
institutions as a means of government.
The critics take up several themes seen as the primary challenges to further 
consolidation of democracy in South Korea. First, there are the predominant 
arguments that some sort of institutional reorganization is needed either (or 
both) on the input side to allow for better articulation of political demands 
within Korean society or on the output side to provide better delivery of 
political decisions by the government. Second, there is the notion that both the 
political elite and the Korean people must somehow become more committed 
to democracy as a superior form of government. In other words, the argument 
here is that there is some sort of flaw in Korea’s political culture that has to be 
modified. Third, the emergence of a stronger civil society complete with 
voluntary organizations that helps sustain popular involvement in the political 
process is viewed as necessary to provide momentum for institutional reform 
and fostering trust in the political process.9
The emergent pattern is that while there is general satisfaction with the 
transition to democracy, the consolidation of democracy is somehow more 
difficult and perhaps there is something inherently defective about the 
consolidation of democracy in South Korea. The task is to evaluate that 
proposition in the context of how the concept of democracy was introduced in 
Korea and the role the concept has played in the transition process. This 
chapter begins with a brief review of the structural evolution of democracy on 
the peninsula. With that basic framework in place, I highlight some of the 
most common criticisms of the consolidation process and examine their root 
causes. The chapter concludes with some thoughts regarding the way forward 
for the development of a truly Korean style of democracy.  
The essential distinction between the terms ‘democratic transition’ and 
‘democratic consolidation’ is that the transition phase is the initial movement 
away from an authoritarian system during which there is a replacement of the 
non-democratic institutions and procedures. Necessary aspects of this 
transition are the implementation of new rules governing the political process 
and an initial willingness on the part of political actors to follow these newly 
established rules. The transition ends with the first democratic elections and 
the assumption of power by the democratically elected government.10 The 
9 Diamond and Kim, op. cit., pp.1-20. 
10 Aurel Croissant, op. cit., pp.6-7, attributes the notion of conceptually separating of the 
transformation phase from the consolidation phase to Guillermo O’Donnel and Philippe 
Schmitter, ‘Transition from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain 
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consolidation phase is more complex and generally involves the process of 
making the new democratic institutions and procedures a routine part of the 
political process within the country. During this phase, the adaptation of the 
new rules and procedures leads to a persistence of process and a stable 
democratic system. Not surprisingly, the more open-ended nature of this 
phase has also led to a much wider diversity in the way it is characterized in the 
literature.11
In his paper on the consolidation of democratic institutions in Korea, 
Croissant presents a model to argue that the consolidation process occurs in 
three dimensions.12  First, the constitutional dimension involves the ability of 
constitutional organs and political institutions (e.g., electoral system, head of 
state, parliament) to function both as independent institutions as well as in 
conjunction with the other components. This dimension involves vertical 
consolidation within each institution as well as horizontal consolidation 
between the various institutions. Second, the representational dimension refers 
to the ability of political parties to serve as ‘gatekeepers’ of the political system. 
Essentially, the consolidation in this dimension reflects the ability of the party 
system to transform societal demands into effective policy options that serve 
as a channel for realizing political aspirations for the majority of citizens. The 
third dimension is attitudinal and associational consolidation, which refers to 
the attitudes towards the political system and the perceived legitimacy of the 
democratic process within the country. With full consolidation, a democratic 
ethos would permeate the society with an expectation that democratic 
principles would be applied to all aspects of political, economic, social and 
cultural life.
Democracies,’ in O’Donnell, Schmitter and Lawrence Whitehead eds., Transition from 
Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990). 
11 Hyug Baeg Im, ‘South Korean Democratic Consolidation in Comparative Perspective,’ in 
Diamond and Kim eds., op cit, pp.21-23 presents the range of views on the issue of 
consolidation. He suggests that minimalist conceptions that limit consolidation to 
institutionalization of competition through elections are too narrow. However, it should be 
noted that there is a general lack of consensus regarding the concept of political consolidation 
in the comparative politics literature. In her article, Andreas Schedler suggests there are at least 
five conceptions of the process (avoiding breakdown, avoiding erosion, completing, 
organizing and deepening) used in the political science literature. The first two conceptions 
focus on preventing breakdown of democracy while the other three focus on the process of 
institutionalizing democracy’s basic ground rules for some implicit or explicit idealized model 
of democratic government.  
12 See Aurel Croissant, op. cit. Within the presentation, Croissant attributes much of his 
conception of the three dimensions to Wolfgang Merkel and Leonardo Merlindo. 
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The attractiveness of this model as a starting point lies in the fact that it 
encompasses the general themes mentioned above that run through much of 
the current literature on the consolidation process in South Korea, namely the 
strengthening of democratic institutions and the role of political or civic 
culture. One of the possible shortcomings of the model is that it tends to be 
based on a normative model of democracy in that it assumes there is a desired 
model of democracy that can be observed through the behavior of political 
actors in the context of the democratic institutions established in the transition 
phase of democratization. The potential problem is that eventually one must 
go beyond the institutions of democracy and examine the basis for Korean 
attitudes about them, namely Korean culture and its particularistic history.   
DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION IN SOUTH KOREA 
There is a body of historical evidence that suggests there was what John 
Kie-Chang Oh refers to as a ‘proto-democratic’ movement in Korea associated 
with the Minjung (peoples’) movement of the later Yi Dynasty, which 
culminated in the Tonghak (Eastern learning) rebellion of the late1800s. In 
referring to the teachings of the Tonghak movement, Oh states that they ‘held 
the first identifiable embryos of what may be called ‘populist’ concepts.13
Elsewhere, the Tonghak rebellion is also identified as the inspirational source 
for Korean resistance movements over the years.14  The significance of this 
connection is that these resistance movements are now becoming the 
inspirational source for much of the enthusiasm for Korean nationalism 
among the younger generation of Koreans. Perhaps because these resistance 
movements have never been particularly successful in gaining any meaningful 
political power, analysts examining the development of democracy in Korea 
have generally ignored them.
A large part of the reason that South Korea has attracted the attention of 
scholars interested in democratic transition is the dramatic way in which the 
political institutions of the Republic of Korea were established. Prior to the 
first constitution in 1948, South Korean society had no real experience with 
democratic institutions. Following thirty-five years of Japanese occupation, 
which ended along with World War II, most Koreans had no understanding of 
13 John Kie-Chang Oh, ‘Kim Dae-jung and a Populist (Tonghak) Origin of Korean 
Democracy,’ in The Korea Society Quarterly (Spring 2001), p.54. 
14 See Soon-kwon Hong, ‘Korean Minjung’s Resistance and the Growth of Modern 
Consciousness from 1876 to 1910 in Korea,’ International Journal of Korean History, Vol. 2, 
(December 2001), pp.137-157. Also see Kenneth Wells ed., South Korea’s Minjung Movement: The 
Culture and Politics of Dissidence (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1995). 
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democratic institutions or representative politics. The election of members to 
the first National Assembly and drafting of the first constitution were based 
on a decision by the US Military Government in Korea to establish a separate 
Korean state south of the thirty-eighth parallel; this after three years of military 
occupation in the face of a communist regime in the Russian-occupied zone 
north of the thirty-eighth parallel that refused to agree to UN supervised 
elections. Not surprisingly, the structure of the First Republic was strongly 
influenced by the American presidential system. The first president, Syngman 
Rhee, who was educated and spent nearly forty years in exile in the United 
States, was nominally elected by the National Assembly, but clearly chosen by 
the United States to be the first leader of the country.15 The unicameral 
National Assembly was made up of two hundred legislators, of which eighty-
five were officially listed as independent. The remaining 115 members 
represented fourteen different political parties.
This rather abrupt establishment of a democratic government without 
significant participation by the South Koreans themselves also created a 
serious void on the representational side of the process. With no national-level 
parties and more than 340 officially registered parties formed by individual 
politicians as vehicles for personal or, at best, local interests, there was no 
effective means for aggregating political demands in the legislative system.16
To complicate matters even further, with the imminent threat of communist 
subversion from both within and from the north, there was little opportunity 
for the development of an ideologically coherent opposition to the president, 
while there was an urgent need for decisive action to deal with the triple crises 
of economic development, rebellion and eventually war. Given the 
circumstances, it is perhaps not surprising that Rhee became increasingly 
powerful by the end of the Korean War in 1953. After the war, Rhee was 
elected by popular vote by increasingly large margins in 1956 and 1960. 
However, in the face of abysmal economic conditions, growing protests in 
South Korea and weakening support from the United States, Rhee eventually 
went into exile in Hawaii.17
15 Bruce Cummings, Korea’s Place in the Sun: A Modern History (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997), 
p.195.
16 Aurel Croissant, ‘Electoral Politics in South Korea,’ in Aurel Croissant ed., Electoral Politics in 
Southeast and East Asia (Bonn: Freidrich-Eibert-Stifung, 2002), pp.234-235 refers to these more 
than 340 parties as proto-parties. 
17 Based on electoral statistics provided by the National Election Commission, Aurel 
Croissant, ‘Electoral Politics in South Korea’, op. cit., p.264, shows that Rhee garnered 70 
percent of the vote in 1956 and 100 percent of the vote in 1960. Also see John Kie-Chiang 
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The disillusionment with the Rhee presidency led, in 1960, to a new 
constitution which provided for a parliamentary form of government with a 
bicameral National Assembly. With the explicit goal of developing a 
democratic system that would prevent the abuses of power experienced during 
the Rhee administration, the new constitution greatly reduced the role of the 
president while expanding individual freedoms of assembly and association. 
Although the Democratic Party, which had been the main opposition party 
during the later days of the Rhee presidency, won a vast majority of seats in 
both houses of the parliament, a split in the party within months of the 
elections led to legislative gridlock. With continuing economic problems, 
accusations of corruption within the government, and widespread student 
demonstrations demanding punishment for the Rhee government, the Second 
Republic was replaced by a military junta led by Major General Park Chung-
hee in 1961, ushering in an extended period of strong military influence in 
South Korean politics. 
After a nearly two-year period of transition under the control of a military 
junta led by Park, the Third Republic was established in 1963. A new 
constitution with a strong presidential system and a weakened National 
Assembly was adopted through national referendum. During the transition, 
Park ensured his own role in the future civilian government by eliminating 
potential rivals from the ranks of the military, banning more than four 
thousand politicians from previous regimes and eventually retiring from the 
military.18 The presidential elections held in 1963 were conducted in a relatively 
fair manner with Park winning by a slim margin with 46.6 percent of the vote. 
Park was elected to a second term in 1967 with 51.4 percent of the vote. In 
both 1963 and 1967 the Democratic Republican Party, also held a slight 
majority in the National Assembly.19
The Park government’s immediate focus was on economic development 
and control of the population to ensure full implementation of the centrally 
formulated economic development plans. Throughout the 1960s the 
Oh, Korean Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), pp.40-43 for a summary of the 
street protests and the withdrawal of support from the United States following the 1960 
elections.
18 Han Sung Joo, ‘South Korea: Politics of Transition,’ in Sang-Yong Choi ed., Democracy in 
Korea: Its Ideals and Realities, (Seoul: The Korean Political Science Association, 1997), pp.30-31. 
19 Election results show that in 1963 Park Chung Hee won 46.6 percent of the vote in a field 
of five candidates with Yun Po-sun, who had been President during the Second Republic, 
coming in second with 45.1 percent. In 1967 Park won by a wider margin over a field of six 
with Yun Po-sun again coming in second with 40.9 percent of the vote. Aurel Croissant, 
‘Electoral Politics in South Korea’, op. cit., pp.235, 265-268. 
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Economic Planning Board, managed by professional economists, and the 
Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA), managed by former military 
colleagues, served as personal instruments for the implementation of Park’s 
vision for a strong anti-communist South Korea. The strength of this 
centralized bureaucracy served to further marginalize an already 
constitutionally weak National Assembly. Under the KCIA’s control of 
internal affairs, opposition politicians were under constant threat of being 
declared a communist or North Korean sympathizer under the National 
Security Law. Political parties served as personal extensions of their leaders, 
which reinforced the perception that the best avenue for articulating political 
demands was through personal networks. As had been the case under the 
increasingly centralized system of Rhee in the 1950s, one of the primary 
venues for expressing political demands throughout the 1960s remained large-
scale street demonstrations, typically led by student organizations.  
By the end of the 1960s, with Park taking full credit for a rapidly growing 
economy, a national referendum was held to approve an amendment to the 
constitution to allow for a third presidential term. In 1971 Park won the 
presidential election over Kim Dae-jung, who was portrayed by the Park 
campaign as being ‘pro-Communist’. However, the relatively close margin of 
victory (53.2 to 45.3 percent) was at least partial motivation for Park to insulate 
himself, in the name of national security, from ever facing elections again. In 
October 1972, Park declared martial law, dissolved the National Assembly, 
banned political parties and closed all national universities and colleges in the 
name of ‘developing democratic institutions best suited for Korea’.20 Following 
the declaration of martial law, the constitution was again amended and ratified 
through a national referendum. Significant changes included a provision to 
prolong Park’s presidency indefinitely through indirect elections by a tightly 
controlled National Conference for Unification, the right of the president to 
nominate one third of the National Assembly member for election by the 
NCFU, and to dissolve the Assembly whenever he deemed necessary.21  The 
new constitution, which was referred to as Yushin (revitalization), ushered in 
the Fourth Republic and a new era of repression in which Park became 
increasingly isolated and paranoid about criticism of the government. By 1979, 
when Park was assassinated by his KCIA director, the country was once again 
being torn apart by violent street demonstrations led by students, but 
increasingly supported by a rapidly growing middle class. 
20 Oh, op. cit., , p.60. 
21 Ibid., p.59. 
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Clearly Park, in his nearly 20 years as leader, had a tremendous impact on 
the development of South Korea’s political system. By the end of his tenure, 
the system was uniquely designed to support the continuation of the Park 
regime. When he died, there was no viable mechanism to replace him. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that despite an attempt by the interim 
government to revise the constitution and eliminate the more draconian 
measures of the Yushin system, another military junta, this time led by Chun 
Doo-hwan, took control of the central government in the name of ensuring 
national security.22 Once again, martial law was declared, the National 
Assembly was dissolved and political parties were banned for nearly a year 
while a new constitution was developed to serve as the basis for the Fifth 
Republic. With the new constitution completed, a newly formed electoral 
committee elected Chun as president for a seven-year term and National 
Assembly elections were held in 1981.
In many respects, Chun’s tenure was a shortened replay of the Park era in 
that the government maintained tight control over both economic 
development through the conglomerate patronage system and became 
increasingly brutal in its attempts to control an increasingly large segment of 
the population that was resorting to street demonstrations. In the absence of a 
meaningful system for aggregating political demands, the newly expanded 
middle class grew more and more willing to support increasingly violent 
demonstrations by students and labor unions. One important difference was 
that from the beginning Chun promised to work towards a peaceful transfer of 
power at the end of his tenure. Despite attempts by Chun to create a party 
system that would ensure the ruling party would retain power after the 
transition, by 1985 the opposition party, led by Kim Dae-jung and Kim 
Young-sam and emboldened by growing pressure from the increasingly violent 
street protesters, had grown strong enough to engage in a serious push to 
revise the constitution prior to the 1987 elections.  
Certainly Chun and his handpicked successor and military academy 
classmate Roh Tae-woo recognized the need for change. Accordingly, Roh, 
with the explicit support of Chun, drafted a democratization package, which 
was presented by Roh on June 29, 1987 as the ‘Declaration of 
Democratization and Reforms’ in a somewhat obvious attempt to avoid defeat 
22 The transitional government led by Ch’oe Kyu Ha revoked several of the ‘emergency 
decrees’ of the Park regime, restored civil rights of Park’s main political rivals and other 
academic, labor and religious leaders who had been accused of communist sympathizers by 
Park. Oh, op. cit., pp.74-75.  
KOREA: CHALLENGES FOR DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION
176
in the upcoming elections. 23  In October 1987 the National Assembly drafted, 
and a national referendum subsequently approved, a new constitution that 
contained much of the contents of the declaration, including the direct election 
of presidents to single five-year terms, a strengthened role for the National 
Assembly that included the right to impeach the president and inspect state 
affairs, political neutrality for the armed forces and a reaffirmation of civil 
rights and due process.   
Despite the transparent manipulation, Roh surprised many by winning the 
election in 1987, although the reason was probably tied as much to the 
unwillingness of both Kim Dae-jung and Kim Young-Sam to join forces to 
defeat him. Roh won the election with 35.9 percent of the vote, while Kim 
Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung received 27.5 and 26.5 respectively.24
Nevertheless, the election served as a watershed in Korean politics. Roh, a 
former Major General, served as a good compromise between the previous 
attempt at democracy in 1960, when the system was gripped in gridlock, and 
the authoritarian regimes of Park and Chun. With a strengthened National 
Assembly in which the three opposition parties and the independents held a 
majority of the seats, Roh adapted remarkably well to party politics. After two 
years of being pushed around by a somewhat raucous National Assembly and 
accused of incompetence in dealing with pressing economic issues, he, along 
with Kim Young-sam (the former political activist) and Kim Jong-pil (Park’s 
erstwhile assistant), formed a three-party alliance that gave them a sizeable 
majority in the National Assembly. Although it was another transparent case 
of political manipulation, the significance of this turn of events should not be 
understated. It was the first time that the president chose to engage the 
opposition within the confines of the constitution rather than attempt to 
solidify control through vertical integration of the executive branch using 
coercive means. In other words, the Roh administration’s actions reaffirmed a 
commitment by the political elite to the idea of party politics as a means for 
maintaining political support. 
The elections in 1992 brought the next important test for democracy in 
Korea. After a realignment of power among the parties during the National 
Assembly elections that reduced the strength of the ‘super-party’ created by 
23 The eight specific items included in the declaration include a call for direct presidential 
elections, a revision of the presidential election law, amnesty and restoration or civil rights for 
dissidents, strengthening of all basic rights in the new constitution, promoting freedom of the 
press, increased local autonomy, improved climate for the growth of political parties and social 
reforms to built a clean and honest society, Oh, op. cit., pp.93-101. 
24 Aurel Croissant, ‘Electoral Politics in South Korea’, op. cit., p.266. 
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the coalition in 1990, the presidential elections fielded three primary candidates 
with no military background or significant military support. In fact, the armed 
forces took a deliberately neutral stance despite the fact that one of the 
candidates (Kim Dae-jung) was viewed by many as being too radical. The 
winner, Kim Young-sam, in many respects represented the compromise 
solution much as Roh had in 1987. Although he had aligned himself with the 
mainstream in the 1990 coalition, he still represented a moderate voice of 
protest from the past. During his administration, Kim actively worked to 
further institutionalize democracy by taking a series of measures explicitly 
designed to discourage military involvement in politics, to reduce corruption 
within the executive branch, and strengthen the legislative system through 
local autonomy and election reforms.  
Perhaps the most memorable undertaking of the Kim Young-sam 
administration was the public trial of former presidents Chun and Roh for 
political corruption for amassing illegal wealth through bribes as well as mutiny 
and treason for their roles in the 1979 coup and the ensuing 1980 Kwangju 
massacre. The unmistakable message was that Kim Young-sam intended to 
show that the judicial system was capable of handling the toughest of cases. It 
certainly did not wipe away all the abuses of the military-dominated rule, 
however it did serve to advance the primacy of the rule of law under a civilian 
government and enhance the constitutional authority of the Supreme Court. 
Together with other reforms, there was a sense that constitutional 
consolidation had been completed by the end of the Kim Young-sam 
administration.
With the 1997 election of the opposition party candidate Kim Dae-jung 
serving as convincing evidence that democracy had passed its first ‘turnover 
test,’ the South Korean democratization process demonstrated a remarkable 
ability to incorporate what had been radicalized elements into the mainstream 
of the South Korean political process.25  Clearly, the institutional structure was 
now well within Dahl’s definition of polyarchy and its focus shifting to 
representative consolidation.26
Beyond the election, Kim Dae-jung did for relations with North Korea 
what Kim Young-sam had done for domestic politics. As a person who had 
been characterized and imprisoned as a communist sympathizer, Kim Dae-
25 Kim Dae-jung’s role in the democratization is legendary, having been the target of both the 
Park and Chun regime’s vengeance. Almost miraculously he survived everything from political 
exile to imprisonment, to a death sentence to at least two assassination attempts. John Kie-
Chiang Oh, Korean Politics, p.60, 232. 
26 Note 3 above. 
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jung was under considerable scrutiny early in his tenure by conservative 
elements in South Korean society. Through his characteristic persistence and 
careful implementation of the policy of engagement with North Korea, 
commonly referred to as the ‘Sunshine Policy’, one of his major contributions 
was the opening up of the ideological debate regarding South-North dialogue. 
Prior to his administration, South Korean debate on the subject was basically 
limited to ways in which the North would be eliminated from the international 
scene. By the end of the administration it was possible for Roh Moo-hyun to 
win the next presidential elections by taking an ideological position that openly 
advocated a continuation of a peaceful dialogue with the North versus Lee 
Hoi-chang’s position that North Korea should be contained. 
The financial crisis of 1997 served as an important milestone in the 
democratization of the domestic agenda in South Korea. As I have suggested, 
both military coups and much of the justification for the authoritarian regimes 
of the past were predicated on the failure of civilian governments to deal 
effectively with economic issues. The fact that the country could deal with the 
crisis without resorting to the centralizing tendencies of the past reinforces the 
notion that South Korea had come to place increasing trust in the civilian 
leadership for resolving issues. For the first time since Park embarked on the 
economic development quest, there was a willingness to engage in a national 
dialogue about pro-development versus pro-democracy. Beyond the crisis, 
there has been a further reduction in the role of the large conglomerates in 
politics and an increased willingness by the military to remain under civilian 
control.
In many ways the election of Roh Moo-hyun in 2002 represents the 
culmination of the textbook case of democratic consolidation. As a civil rights 
lawyer who advocated the removal of US forces in the 1980s Roh represents 
the antithesis of the restrictive ideological perspective and tight central control 
present at the start of the consolidation in 1987. The process of systematically 
incorporating increasingly radical elements of the population into the political 
system with each subsequent administration has been truly remarkable. 
Certainly much of the success of the consolidation should be attributed to men 
like Kim Dae-jung whose faith in the system kept him coming back for thirty 
years despite so many disappointments and challenges. It is also a testament to 
the growing acceptance of the democratic process following the rather vague 
ideal put forward by the original constitution.
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ASSESSING PROGRESS TOWARD DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION 
However, as the extensive research on the subject testifies, there are some 
significant structural problems remaining for Korea’s process towards 
democratic consolidation, especially in the areas of representational 
consolidation and the horizontal integration between the various branches of 
government.27  These structural deficiencies continue to make South Korean 
politics vulnerable to manipulation by individuals with personal or restricted 
agendas and may lead to the institutional gridlock that in the past led to a 
reversion to centralized control. 
In terms of representational consolidation there continues to be a lack of 
ideological distinction between the parties. For example, during the 2002 
presidential elections there was still a great deal of shifting within the party 
structure. The near collapse of Roh’s Millennium Democratic Party following 
mass defections by National Assembly members, the truncated campaign by 
Chung Mong-joon under a newly created party and the alignment of Park 
Kyun-hye with Lee Hoi-chang just weeks before the election all suggest that 
there is still a lack of ideological distinction between the parties. This continual 
shifting of loyalty between parties and the emergence of parties based on the 
personal perspective of individual politicians reflects a certain structural 
weakness of parties to broaden their ideological bases to deal with national-
level interests.
The lack of horizontal consolidation within the government continues to 
plague relations between the president and the National Assembly. As 
Croissant correctly asserts, the relationship between these two ‘generally 
oscillates between the two extremes of hyper-presidential dominance on the 
one hand and institutional gridlock on the other’.28  The danger of this 
oscillation was clearly demonstrated during the Kim Young-sam 
administration, which began its tenure with a long series of executive decrees 
under a strong popular mandate to implement a wide range of reforms only to 
27 Two edited volumes, Larry Diamond and Byung-Kook Kim eds., Consolidating Democracy in 
South Korea (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2000), and Larry Diamond and Doh Chull Shin eds., 
Institutional Reform and Democratic Consolidation in Korea (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 
2000), have been published to specifically address the consolidation of democracy in Korea. 
Within, these volumes, individual authors address a wide variety of topics dealing with the 
difficulties associated with institutional reforms needed to complete the consolidation of 
democracy initially envisioned in the Roh Tae Woo’s 1987 declaration to the National 
Assembly.
28 Croissant, ‘Strong Presidents, Weak Democracy?’, op. cit.,  p.14. 
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end up in failure, as it was unable to build a strong supporting coalition in the 
National Assembly to complete the reforms. As a result, the administration 
achieved initial success in the areas of anti-corruption among the elite, but was 
unable to complete wider economic and social reforms later in the 
administration as it was unable to coordinate its efforts with the opposition 
parties in control of the National Assembly.29  Similar dilemmas have faced the 
Roh Tae-woo and Kim Dae-jung administrations when they were faced with a 
majority opposition in the National Assembly and in each case, the tendency 
has been for the president to resort to his decree authority—reminiscent of the 
solution sought by the strongman regimes of Rhee, Park and Chun. Proposed 
solutions have ranged from minor modifications to the election process such 
as linking the National Assembly and presidential elections or switching to a 
parliamentary form of government.30  The point is that unless these structural 
weaknesses are addressed in a systematic way they will continue to make the 
political process in South Korea vulnerable to a wide range of problems 
including corruption, cronyism, and regionalism, all of which eventually lead to 
the potential for institutional paralysis.  
Another area that has received critical attention throughout the 
consolidation phase of Korean democratization is that of individual rights and 
freedom of expression. Much of the criticism leveled against the central 
government is associated with the persistence of the notorious National 
Security Law. Promulgated in 1948 to protect the ‘State’ from ‘enemies’ 
defined in one Article as ‘any person who defames constitutional organs,’ the 
law has been used over the years to prosecute political opponents.31  It was 
paradoxical that the law was still in place after five years of the administration 
of Kim Dae-jung, who had been sentenced to death under its provisions. 
However, there remains a general reluctance to significantly modify the law, 
partly in deference to the large portion of the population that continues to 
believe the law prevents North Korean subversion, especially among the 
student population.
As have previous administrations, the Kim Dae-jung administration also 
came under criticism by the annual Press Freedom Survey conducted by 
Freedom House for its continued political and economic pressure especially 
29 Young Jo Lee, ‘The Rise and Fall of Kim Young-Sam’s Embedded Reformism,’ in Diamond 
and Shin, op. cit.,  pp.97-126. 
30 Larry Diamond and Doh Chull Shin, ‘ Introduction: Institutional Reform and Democratic 
Consolidation in Korea,’ in Diamond and Shin, op. cit., p.39. Also see Hoon Juang, ‘Electoral 
Politics and Political Parties,’ in Ibid.,  pp.43-71. 
31 Oh, op. cit.,  p.37. 
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on the print media.32  Elsewhere, Human Rights Watch has actively protested 
the continued detention of human rights advocate Suh Joon-sik, while the 
International Press Institute placed South Korea on its watch list in 2001 for 
harassment of independent media.
One area of representational consolidation that has seen a dramatic 
improvement, as the political process has expanded to incorporate larger 
segments of the population, is that of civic organizations. There is an 
assumption that legitimate civic organizations replace radicalized protest 
movements as the mechanism for aggregating political demands as the country 
matures as a democracy, Croissant argues that these organizations, which grew 
in number from 1,322 in 1984 to 2,181 in 1996, with 75 percent being founded 
between 1987 and 1996, have, in fact, replaced the older student groups, labor 
union activists and farmer dissident groups.33  However, it is also the case that 
following the 1997 financial crisis, the government was actively engaged in 
suppressing labor-union organizations involved in protesting measures to 
eliminate restrictions on firing workers. Similarly, several student organizations 
such as the Hanchongryon continue to be the subject of government sanctions in 
the name of the National Security Law. 
South Korean attitudes towards the progress made in terms of institutional 
reforms have been somewhat skeptical. In an extensive analysis of the political 
attitudes, Doh Chull Shin refers to a large segment of the population as ‘critical 
democrats,’ meaning those who broadly accept democracy as a preferred 
alternative to the authoritarian regimes of the past, while remaining skeptical 
of the daily performance of the government and suspicious of political 
institutions.34 One conventional indication of this scepticism is the declining 
participation in elections. For example, participation in the presidential 
elections has declined each year since 1987 when 89.2 percent of the registered 
voters participated to the 2002 race when 70.2 percent participated.35
32 Annual Press Freedom Survey. Freedom House, 2002. The report was specifically critical of 
the Kim Dae-jung administration’s decision to bring a massive tax evasion suit against the five 
largest daily newspapers in what appeared to be retaliation for printing negative stories about 
its North Korean engagement policy and showed a downtrend in the degree of press freedom 
in South Korea. http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/pressurvey.htm.
33 Croissant, ‘Strong Presidents, Weak Democracy?’, op. cit., p.34 
34 Doh C. Shin, Mass Politics and Culture in Democratizing Korea (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999), p 124. 
35 Aurel Croissant, ‘Electoral Politics in South Korea’, op. cit., p 266 and ‘North Asia,: 
Assessing the Implications of Roh’s Victory, in Asiaint.com, January 2003. . 
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What becomes apparent in trying to isolate aspects of attitudinal 
consolidation is that while institutions are important in terms of providing a 
framework within which democratic transition occurs, they are marginally 
useful in understanding actual attitudes towards democracy itself. They are 
both cause and consequence. In other words, it is true that a strong civil 
society does help build a strong basis for aggregating political demands. 
However, it is equally true those civic organizations are likely to prosper in a 
context where people know that they are the primary mechanism for 
aggregating political demands. Similarly, while it is true that strongly 
institutionalized political parties help consolidate attitudes towards democracy, 
it is equally true that the consolidation of democracy helps strengthen and 
institutionalize political parties. This fact, then, is an interesting observation, 
but not terribly informative in terms of explaining democratic consolidation.
This leads to a confrontation with a more problematic aspect of attitudinal 
consolidation in South Korea, that of cultural acceptance of democracy as a 
universal value rather than an ideology. Here we enter the generation-long 
debate about political culture introduced primarily by Almond and Verba in 
the 1960s.36  The problem arises in that there is the assumption within the 
approach that anything other than acceptance of Western or ‘modern’ attitudes 
towards democracy are ‘traditional’ and somehow inadequate to the challenges 
of a truly participatory democracy. Accordingly much of the literature on the 
cultural aspects of the democratic transition in South Korea either starts with 
the premise that Korean, or Asian or Confucian values are somehow 
detrimental to or constitute insurmountable barriers to democratic 
consolidation. The argument is succinctly summarized by Francis Fukuyama 
when he states:
If we take Confucianism as the dominant value system in Asia, we see that it describes 
an ethical world in which people are born not with rights but with duties to a series of 
hierarchically arranged authorities, beginning with the family and extending all the way 
up to the state and emperor. In this world there is no concept of the individual and 
individual rights; duties are not derived from rights as they are in Western liberal 
thought, and although there is a concept of reciprocal obligation between ruler and 
ruled, there is no absolute grounding of government responsibility either in popular 
will or in the need to respect an individual’s sphere of autonomy.37
36 Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba are generally credited with introducing a systematic 
analysis of political culture in their book titled The Civic Culture (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1963). 
37 Francis Fukuyama, ‘Asian Values, Korean Values, and Democratic Consolidation,’ in 
Diamond and Shin, op. cit., p.307-308. 
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For South Korea, these ‘barriers’ to democracy usually include some 
reference to Confucian reliance on authoritarianism, filial piety (veneration of 
elders), and patriarchy as being obstacles to a fully consolidated democracy 
based on Almond and Verba’s conceptualization of political culture as those 
‘political orientations necessary to achieve a truly democratic civic culture’.38
The assertion then is that these attributes of traditional Korea serve as barriers 
to the full development of democracy in Korean society. Another aspect of 
Korean culture cited as inhibiting democratic consolidation is Korean 
familism, which is frequently attributed to Korean shamanism and blamed for 
a patronage system that encourages politicians to reward votes with favors and, 
more generally, political corruption. Here the charges are that this ‘traditional’ 
feature of Korean culture prevents effective party consolidation at the national 
level, promotes bias in regional economic development and sustains crony 
capitalism.
This mindset that there are some universal Confucian principles that drive 
Asian societies away from democracy is found on both sides of the ‘Asian 
values’ debate. On the one hand are scholars such as Fukuyama and 
Huntington who view the notion of a Confucian democracy as a sort of 
contradiction in terms.39  Essentially, the argument is that the Confucian 
emphasis on authority over liberty and social responsibility over individual 
rights precludes the adoption of democracy in cultures influenced by 
Confucian thought. On the other hand are scholars such as Bell and Jurasuriya 
who argue that although there is the potential for compatibility between the 
two, it is more a matter of justifying democracy in terms of its value in 
promoting equality and familial ways of life rather than individual freedoms 
and rights.40 In both cases, however, there is an assumption that Confucianism 
is a somewhat monolithic force that ignores other contending values that 
influence evolving political systems in the region.
In a somewhat different vein, the ‘natural’ regional cleavage between the 
Honam and Youngnam regions of the country is blamed for limiting the 
effectiveness of national-level parties and creating an impediment to 
democratic consolidation. The difference from the universalizing tendency of 
the Confucian compatibility debate being that although not directly attributed 
to Korean culture, there is a tendency to transfer the historical differences 
38 Almond and Verba, op. cit., p.13. 
39 Huntington, op. cit., p.37. 
40 Daniel A. Bell and Kanishka Jayasuriya, ‘Understanding Illiberal Democracy: A Framework,’ 
in Daniel A. Bell, David Brown, Kanishka Jayasuriya and David Martin Jones eds., Towards
Illiberal Democracy in Pacific Asia (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), pp.1-16. 
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between the two regions onto the modern political system as if direct 
presidential elections re-ignited some primordial hostility between the 
regions.41 Again, this sort of analysis falls short in that it focuses the attention 
on historical antecedents as the root cause rather than on how the modern 
elites such as Japanese colonialists and the Park and Chun regimes used those 
antecedents to maintain control of the political processes in the country. The 
difference is not insignificant. 
The persistence of these universalizing analytical approaches is reflected by 
Diamond and Shin when they conclude that South Korean ‘support for 
democracy...tends to remain superficial, fragmented and mixed with 
authoritarian habits’.42  In fact, what remains superficial is the South Korean 
embrace of the democratic institutions that do not seem to fit very well in 
South Korean society. As a result, there are essentially two languages present 
in South Korean politics. On the one hand there are the formal 
acknowledgements of liberal democracy and capitalism that are enshrined in 
the constitution and the institutions adopted in 1948 as an ideological vaccine 
against communism. On the other hand, there are the informal relationships 
that serve as a pragmatic and functional underpinning of Korean acceptance of 
liberal democratic principles in terms of Korean culture. For example, 
although political parties have been present since 1948, the fact is that they 
continue to serve as platforms for individual candidates from the Presidential 
candidates to the lowest local assembly official to consolidate support in a 
highly personalized network that is readily recognizable as an adaptation of 
Korean familism to the institutional framework of liberal democracy.43
41 It should be noted that Wonmo Dong in ‘Regional Cleavage in South Korean Politics,’ Korea 
Observer, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Summer 1995), pp.1-26, correctly identifies the discriminatory policies 
of the Park Chung Hee regime in the 1960s and 1970s as exacerbating the regional cleavage 
between the two regions. However, he goes on to suggest that the problem originated in the 
center-periphery antagonism that developed during the Chosun (Yi) Dynasty (1392-1910), or 
perhaps even earlier during the Silla Kingdom (668-935), which was centered on the nobility 
from the Youngnam region. Also see Gregory Henderson, The Politics of Vortex (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1968) for a discussion regarding the impact of the centralized 
bureaucracy of the Chosun Dynasty on the development of modern political relationships in 
South Korea.  
42 Diamond and Shin, ‘Institutional Reform and Democratic Consolidation’, op. cit.,  p.35. 
43 Byung-Kook Kim, ‘Party Politics in South Korea’s Democracy: The Crisis of Success,’ in 
Diamond and Kim, op. cit.,  pp.63-66, attributes the origins of familism in Korea to 
Confucianism. Helgesen, op. cit., suggests that Shamanism, which he suggests has a longer 
history in Korea than Confucianism and persists in Korea despite official prohibition, has an 
equally important role in reinforcing the importance of familism and patriarchy in Korean 
society.  
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Elsewhere, others argue that the two Confucian concepts of minben (power 
and authority are derived from and based on the masses) and winmin (elites 
pursue public interest and serve the masses) form the moral basis for Korean 
understanding of electoral democracy and political legitimacy.44 This basis, 
coupled with a pragmatic imperative for social order and economic prosperity, 
made the acceptance of democracy quite tolerable despite the obvious 
contradiction that the military strongmen of the pre-1987 era represented to 
the Western world.  Without any deeper basis in Korean culture, Kim Byong-
Kook argues that these adaptations represent a serious danger to the 
persistence of democracy in that they have delayed the recognition of any 
viable political cleavages on which to base party politics. Instead, political 
parties have been formed around regional cleavages, which he correctly notes 
are superficial and cannot serve as a long-term basis for meaningful political 
cleavages because they are derived from the extended familism practiced by 
the politicians of the pre-1987 democratic era and not actual ideological 
differences between people from the regions.45
We are left to conclude that with the disappearance of the ideological basis 
(that is, a means for resisting communism) and the achievement of its 
procedural goal of conducting free and fair presidential elections, democracy 
has lost its way in South Korea. For Kim, the failure is attributed to the 
inability of Korean culture to adapt to the structural imperatives of liberal 
democracy.46 In effect, he is arguing that South Korea represents democratic 
endurance rather than any consolidation of democratic institutions in support 
of universal liberal democratic principles. The challenge then becomes finding 
some political cleavage to help foster a sense of democratic competition 
among political parties.
The 2002 presidential election was interesting in this respect in the 
ideological cleavage that emerged over how to deal with North Korea, 
characterized in the words of the Roh Moo-hyun campaign slogan ‘peace or 
war’. However, this would appear to be a rather temporary cleavage in that it 
seems extremely unlikely that with the generational shift occurring in the 
country that there could ever be a shift back to a hostile policy towards the 
44 Byung-Kook Kim, op. cit.,  pp.71-72. Also see Viren Murthy, ‘The Democratic Potential of 
Confucian Minben Thought,’ Asian Philosophy, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2000, for a more complete 
explanation of the concepts in the context of Confucian philosophy. 
45 Byung-Kook Kim, op. cit., pp.79-80 describes Korean regionalism as ‘an amorphous 
sentiment of belonging without a specific program of policy action’. He further argues that the 
voters themselves rejected the notion of regionalism as a legitimate organizing principle. 
46 Ibid.
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North without some sort of catastrophic event similar to a replay of the war. 
Rather, the fact that it appeared late in the campaign and only after more 
traditional approaches such as coalitions of political convenience and grand 
promises to virtually all constituencies appeared to be failing, suggests that the 
highlighting of the difference was indeed temporary.  
Perhaps a more interesting part of the Roh Moo-hyun campaign has to do 
with the fact that in the later days of the campaign he spoke the unspeakable 
when he suggested that South Korea would not automatically support the 
United States if it chose to take military action against North Korea. The fact 
that this could be said at all is testament to the notion that the old ideological 
basis for democratization has deteriorated to the point that people no longer 
see the threat of communism from the North as a basis for making political 
choices. Further, this sentiment reflects the rapidly rising sense of Korean 
nationalism, a nationalism that traces its origins to the Tonghak (Eastern 
Thought) movements of the late 1800s and more recently the Minjung 
(people’s) movement of the 1980s. In this context, it is important to recognize 
that the ideological foundation of the revitalized Minjung movement in the 
1980s is based on two essential tenets. First, the ideology asserts that the 
fundamental problem in Korea is the separation of the country following the 
end of World War II, which has led to a dependence on the United States. In 
that sense the US has been viewed as a successor to the Japanese colonialists 
and the Yangban (ruling elite) of the Chosun Dynasty. A second assertion from 
the ideology is that, based on that dependency, all the US-backed regimes 
served to repress the people (minjung) the nation (minjok) and democracy 
(minju).47  Given these ideological roots, it should not be surprising that, once 
elected, the rather pragmatic Roh Moo-hyun has quickly distanced himself 
from the more radical elements of the current anti-American protests. 
Nevertheless, it is important to remember that there is a strong undercurrent 
of mistrust and resentment against not only a continued American military 
presence in the country, but also the generally dominant role the US has played 
in South Korean politics since the inception of the Republic in 1948.
What is important about the emergence of nationalism is that it appears at 
a time when there is a search for a new ideological basis for democracy within 
Korea. Given the fact that South Koreans have come to embrace democracy 
as ‘the only game in town,’ the challenge for its further consolidation is to 
recognize the need to root future changes in the institutional structure of 
democracy in the cultural foundations of Korean nationalism. As if the 
47 Oh, op. cit.,  p.88. 
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challenge of attempting to consolidate political institutions was not difficult 
enough, the Koreans face a second challenge of reconciling those institutions 
with a populist movement that has grown over the decades as a challenge to 
the ideological basis of the institutions themselves. Certainly, the suppression 
of the populist movements by previous regimes makes the task more difficult, 
though the passing of the Kim presidencies will ease the burden if only 
because there is no longer pressure to accommodate the factions of the 
original democracy movement.
PROXIMATE TASKS OF DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION 
Given the context of the incomplete institutional consolidation and the 
shifting ideological basis for democracy, there are four proximate tasks 
associated with democratic consolidation in Korea. These tasks will not 
complete the consolidation task. However, they will provide a useful 
framework for further consolidation in terms of the current disjunction 
between popular attitudes towards political action and the political institutions 
of democracy.
The first proximate consolidation task (a challenge for each president since 
the inception of the Republic) is the need to reduce the level of corruption in 
both the daily operation of the government as well as in the election process. 
Or, perhaps more accurately, the challenge is to better institutionalize the 
corruption in more acceptable ways than has been done in the past. This task 
takes on increased importance today because with the new generation that is 
coming into power there is the opportunity to demonstrate in a visible way 
that the practices institutionalized during the ‘strongman’ era and continued by 
the first generation of democracy advocates are no longer necessary to achieve 
political success. First, in terms of the election process, the fact that Rho Moo-
hyun was selected as the Millennium Democratic Party nominee through a 
primary election process suggests that there is an opportunity to 
institutionalize the selection process while minimizing the influence of 
‘backroom’ negotiations. From an institutional perspective, the campaigns of 
both Roh and Lee relied much more on the support of civic organizations 
than past elections, which should at least help institutionalize campaign 
financing even if it does not eliminate all of the corruption. Second, it will be 
equally important for the Roh administration to continue and strengthen anti-
corruption measures initiated by both Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung 
with the specific purpose of avoiding a perception of bias in political 
appointments and involvement of his family in political deal-making. This 
becomes critical in Korea as further movement toward democratic 
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consolidation will increasingly require the political elite to identify themselves 
with the democratic ‘rules of the game,’ which includes an agreement to treat 
everyone equally before the law—something that appears to have been lost on 
families of the previous generation of democratic leaders in Korea.
A second task to be undertaken sooner rather than later is to reduce the 
importance of regionalism on national-level politics. Although it is generally 
recognized that much of the problem with regionalism stemmed from the Park 
regime’s deliberate favoritism towards the Youngnam region, the fact remains 
that regionalism continues to be an issue in South Korean politics as evidenced 
during the 2002 elections, when Roh Moo-hyun won well over 90 percent of 
the vote in the Honam provinces of North and South Cholla and Lee Hoi-
chang won 77.7 percent in Taegu City and 73.4 percent in North Kyongsang 
province in the Youngnam region.48  Despite the anticipation that the problem 
of regionalism will disappear with the passing of the Kim era, the election 
results suggest that there will have to be explicit policies implemented to 
further reduce the importance of regional politics in future presidential 
elections. Given that Roh Moo-hyun is from the Youngnam region and will be 
under less pressure to compensate for previous abuses than was Kim Dae-
jung, it should be comparatively easy to avoid the pattern of appointing his 
staff and Cabinet based on regional considerations as Kim Dae-jung has been 
accused of doing. However, the huge disparity in the voting patterns between 
the two regions in the 2002 elections suggests that it will require more than 
symbolism on the part of the Roh Moo-hyun administration to demonstrate a 
movement away from regional favoritism in both economic development 
initiatives and political appointments.
To make effective progress in these tasks a third task that must be 
undertaken is for the political elite to acknowledge and accept the non-Korean 
origins and aspects of the Republic. Specifically, this will mean an 
acknowledgement that the Syngman Rhee government was to a large extent 
‘installed’ by the US and that the Republic itself was established in response to 
the threat of communism in the North rather than as an expression of Korean 
nationalism or cultural demand for democracy. That fact does not de-
legitimize the current government as much as it allows for a more factual 
accounting of the decisions made during the period of the democratic 
transition prior to 1987. As I have shown, the political system during that 
period was almost exclusively controlled by the elite, and political demands of 
48 So, Su-min, ‘Regionalism Manifested Again in Election—West for Roh, East for Lee’, Korea
Times, December 21, 2002, http://www.korealink.co.kr/times/times.htm.
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the larger population were left to the same mechanisms that had served as the 
outlet for popular demands since at least the 1860s when the Tonghak
movement began. 
Another aspect in recognizing the non-Korean origins will be the 
acknowledgement of the Japanese origin of much of Park Chung-hee’s effort 
to develop the economy.49  The effects of this acknowledgement are already 
well underway in that the large Korean conglomerates have been gradually 
dismantled following the 1997 financial crisis. What has been missing is the 
explicit recognition that much of the economic and political infrastructure that 
helped sustain those conglomerates was based on a Japanese model despite the 
consistent government policy of making it illegal to import Japanese culture. 
Further manifestations of the shift have been the gradual shift away from 
American influence and the easing of restrictions on Japanese culture during 
Kim Dae-jung’s presidency. This aspect is difficult for the South Korean 
government in that it partly affirms the criticism leveled by the North that the 
successive governments in the South were ‘puppets’ of the United States and 
Japan. Nevertheless, as the ideological basis for the government shifts more 
explicitly to nationalism, the acknowledgement of Japanese influence becomes 
both easier and more necessary. It becomes easier because it signals a 
willingness to incorporate an element of South Korean society into the 
mainstream of the political system. It becomes more necessary because an 
unwillingness to acknowledge the nationalist heritage would eventually alienate 
the political elite from the popular sentiment.
Along similar lines, the fourth proximate task is to acknowledge the 
authoritarian past, both in terms of the tendency in historical Confucianism 
toward centralized control in the name of the social control and the emphasis 
on the ‘output’ institutions that have characterized previous South Korean 
governments.50  Here it is important to distinguish between an 
acknowledgement and fatalistic acceptance. In other words, the fact of the 
authoritarian past should not be used as an excuse for the continuation of a 
‘so-called’ illiberal democracy or a reversion back to the control mechanisms 
for the purpose of intimidating those who disagree with government policies 
that have characterized the Kim Young-sam and, to a lesser extent, the Kim 
49 Cummings, op. cit., pp.358-359 and Oh, op. cit., pp.48-50.
50 Han Sung Joo, ‘South Korea: Politics of Transition,’ in Democracy in Korea: Its Ideals and 
Realities (Seoul: The Korean Political Science Association, 1997), p.67 refers to the ‘over-
development of output institutions’ especially the military and civil control institutions such as 
the KCIA and the Economic Planning Board during the Park regime as the natural extension 
of Confucian tendency to centralized control as exacerbated by the Japanese colonialists.  
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Dae-jung administrations. One of the most urgent mandates that must be 
undertaken is the elimination or at least serious revision of the National 
Security Law. As written, the law is violated every day there is contact between 
the South and the North and no longer serves any real purpose other than to 
potentially intimidate private citizens who make contact without explicit South 
Korean governmental approval.
In terms of Confucian tendency to centralization, the argument is not 
about tradition versus modernity or, in other terms, to replace Confucian 
‘social harmony’ values with Western ‘civic culture’ values. Instead, the need is 
to recognize that in Korea, the tendency has been to treat popular protests as 
an aberration rather than as a voice of legitimate public concern with aspects 
of the political system. As long as the political elite resists incorporating these 
demands into the political process, there will be the need to take dramatic 
action after the protests have become such an obvious scar on social harmony 
that they can no longer be ignored. Therefore, the recognition should that this 
sort of denial is actually rather detrimental to social harmony and that 
incorporating these voices into the mainstream political process would actually 
be a fulfillment of Confucian values.  
DEVELOPING KOREAN-STYLE DEMOCRACY 
A major theme that emerges from the examination of the democratization 
process in South Korea is that the consolidation of democracy is a 
fundamentally different problem from that of the initial transition. Essentially, 
what we have seen is that prior to 1987 during the transition phase democracy 
was a goal focused on the normative belief that democracy and its supporting 
market mechanisms were superior to the communism adopted in the North. 
Despite this, the fact is that the leadership during this period exhibited 
behavior that suggested they were less than fully committed to Dahl’s 
polyarchic principles of individual freedoms and free and fair elections.51
However, during the consolidation phase, the ‘practice’ of democratic politics 
should extend to ever-larger circles of citizens beginning with the political elite 
of the opposition and hopefully expanding to the most radicalized elements of 
society. In Korea, we have seen that clearly the opposition elite represented by 
Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung were included in, and demonstrated 
extraordinary faith in, the democratic process even before 1987. During the 
consolidation phase there has been a growing sense of democratic expansion 
as evidenced by the expansion of civic organizations involved in aggregating 
51 Note 3 above. 
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political demands in a systematic fashion rather than in the form of street 
protests.
However, we have also seen that especially in the ‘opposition phase’ of the 
consolidation process, there is a growing sense of dissatisfaction with the 
political institutions and government adoption of democratic practices.52 Some 
of the dissatisfaction stems from the shift in the ideological basis for 
democracy from the Cold War debate over democracy versus communism to 
one grounded in Korean nationalism. Evidence that the shift has not yet been 
completed manifests itself in several areas. Much of the nationalist movement 
remains outside the mainstream of Korean politics, largely based on the 
expectation that student groups espousing nationalism represent subversive 
elements supported by the North. Similarly, the protest movement against 
American troop presence on the peninsula, which has come to represent 
adherence to the former ideological basis, remains largely a street movement, 
although the fact that both candidates in the 2002 election ended up calling for 
a re-examination of the rules governing the presence of US military on the 
peninsula suggests that there is a general recognition by the political elite that it 
will be necessary to include the issue in future political discourse. Within 
Korean policy circles the emphasis on the need for a dismantlement of the 
Cold War structure on the peninsula also suggests that the shift to an 
ideological basis for democracy grounded in Korean nationalism is rapidly 
becoming a behavioral norm that will allow the inclusion of at least a major 
portion of the indigenous populist movement dating back to the Tonghak 
rebellion into the mainstream of Korean politics.
The assessment of the institutional aspects of democracy and the 
proximate tasks associated with the representational consolidation suggest a 
more fundamental dilemma facing any assessment of Korean attitudes towards 
democracy, namely a reconciliation of Korean culture and democratic norms. 
The immediate problem faced in this context is the matter of measuring norms 
based on observed behavior. Using this approach, we can examine the record 
of Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung and conclude that, as outlined earlier, 
because their administrations acted in non-democratic fashion in dealing with 
political adversaries or in financing their respective election campaigns, they 
52 Here I am referring to the Kim Dae-jung administration as the opposition phase of the 
consolidation process based on the definition of polyarchy provided by Dahl in that the Kim 
administration represented the first successful election of the opposition party. Despite his 
identity as the opposition prior to 1987, the election of Kim Young-sam in 1992 should not be 
viewed as the first election of the opposition based on his alliance with Roh Tae Woo and the 
majority party in 1990. 
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were not fully committed to democratic norms. Some scholars take it a step 
further and suggest that it represents the incompatibility between traditional 
Korean culture and democratic norms.53  There are two important 
considerations to remember here. First, individual actors within the system are 
acting on any number of norms beyond those ascribed to some ideal form of 
democracy. Therefore, it would be wrong to conclude an administration is 
‘non-democratic’ based solely on observed behavior. Until norms of 
democracy that are different from the observed behavior they are supposed to 
explain are articulated, it will be difficult to attribute causality of behavior. 
Second, the notion that traditional Korean culture competes with democracy 
suggests that both democracy and culture are static systems that simply 
compete in a world of cultural norms.  
Democratic consolidation in Korea or any place else is not about 
modernity versus tradition. Instead it is about the gradual adaptation of a 
variety of norms in the context in which they are acted upon. The longer 
democracy remains the dominant political ideology, the more it becomes 
accepted as a dominant norm and the more it becomes a dominant norm the 
more it becomes the dominant ideology. So, democracy has changed Korea 
and Korea has changed democracy. Along the way a host of influences have 
impacted on Korean attitudes towards democracy well beyond a static notion 
of Confucianism. In fact there are a number of influences that have had a 
major influence on so-called traditional norms of behavior since the adoption 
of democracy in 1948. For example, South Korea has become a largely urban 
society with a very internationalized citizenry. There has been a shift in 
religious orientation so that today nearly fifty percent of those claiming 
religious affiliation describe themselves as Christians. The country has 
experienced a civil war and a generation of military strongman leadership along 
with an extended presence of US forces. Similarly, there have been the 
moderating influences on the ‘American style’ democratic institutions 
including Confucianism, Buddhism, vestiges of Japanese colonialism and 
Korean nationalism.
The real underlying challenge in the consolidation process then is the 
adaptation of Korean identities into the democratic process. That is why 
reconciliation between Korean nationalism and the institutional arrangements 
that were put in place during the transition phase of democratization is so 
53 This follows the argument made by Kwang Yeong Shin and Chulhee Chung in a conference 
paper titled, ‘Cultural Tradition and Democracy in South Korea,’ (ND) available at  
http://www.arts.monash.edu.au/korean/ksaa/conference/papers//04chulheechingkwangyeo
ngshin.pdf, downloaded 30 November 2002.  
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critically important. This relationship represents the nexus between the two 
separate democratic identities that have evolved in Korea. They are the merger 
between the populist identity from the later days of the Chosun Dynasty and 
the liberal democratic identity that was formed among the political elite since 
1948. The reconciliation will enable creative Korean solutions to the unique 
Korean issues related to the adoption of democracy grounded in Korean 
identity.
How this reconciliation plays itself out should be observable in the four 
proximate tasks discussed above. As there is a growing acknowledgement of 
the non-Korean origin of the institutional organization of the present 
government, one would expect to see a greater willingness to examine 
alternatives to the existing constitutional arrangement and representational 
mechanisms. Certainly, there must be some recognition that dealing with the 
issue of regionalism and political corruption will involve re-examining these 
issues as problems that are unique to Korea since the practical arrangements 
that have allowed these practices evolved outside the controls of modern 
democracy and were blamed on traditional culture. However, the practices also 
evolved outside the constraints of any traditional moral norms and were 
blamed by others on the introduction of democratic institutions. The challenge 
then is to find a set of ‘game rules’ that provide for the aggregation of political 
demands that is recognized by participants as being fair and consistent with 
norms associated with fair representation and family or regional identities. 
Clearly these solutions cannot be based on any normative universal from an 
idealized form of liberal democracy. Rather they must be grounded in the 
emerging Korean identity that takes into account its entire past in the search 
for a truly representational democracy.  
In conclusion, Korea is at the threshold of democratic consolidation. It is 
clear that Korea has moved well beyond the threat of returning to the military 
strongman politics of the 1960s and 1970s. The demand for civilian 
government elected through free and fair elections is firmly entrenched and 
there is general acceptance of the notion of opposition parties and ideologies. 
However, there remains a disjuncture between populist and political elites that 
occurred at least partially as a result of the circumstances surrounding the 
development of democracy in Korea. With the ideological basis of democracy 
moving in the direction of nationalism, there is an excellent opportunity to 
reconcile this disjuncture. In addition, the consolidation of Korean attitudes 
towards democracy requires the reconciliation of existing political institutions 
with Korean identity. Reconciliation must be a mutually reinforcing process, 
whereby the institutions are modified to adjust to Korean identities just as the 
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existence of these institutions over the past 50 years have modified Korean 
identity with traditional political values. What is clear is that there is no 
particular aspect of Korean identity that precludes the development of liberal 
democracy. Although the particular form Korean democracy ultimately takes 
almost certainly will be different from that found in the United States or, for 
that matter, Western Europe. Nevertheless, if the Korean people are allowed 
to find an appropriate balance between the need for the community values that 
are valorized in traditional identity structures and the individual freedoms that 
are valorized in liberal democracy in the context of its own historical 
circumstances, it will be a happy place.
